How high-yielding seeds became symbols of modernity during Green Revolution

Even after accounting for all the ecological, political and economic criticisms against the green revolution, the role of the movement in dramatically increasing food production in India cannot be contested. The State achieved this by relying on modern agricultural practices and weaving into it development narratives, institutional structures and public participation, says science historian Abhinav Tyagi.

“During the green revolution, the State positioned itself as the custodian and distributor of scientific progress,” says Tyagi, a former research fellow at NCBS Archives, during his talk on “Revisiting the Green Revolution: Statecraft of cultivating modernity,” where he spoke about the role of statecraft in shaping the agricultural landscape of the country.

The global food crisis 

World War II witnessed hunger- or famine-related deaths matching or outnumbering fatalities during military operations. It is estimated that 25 million people outside Europe died of hunger or hunger-related ailments. Blockades and prioritisation of military over civilians for allocation food resulted in several millions suffering, particularly in occupied regions and colonies.  

‘“Grow more food’ campaign was sort of an international movement launched in various parts of the world as a response to this global food crisis,” says Tyagi.

“In Britain the campaign tried to blend the nationalist and agrarian image together, a different version of ‘Jai Jawan Jai Kisan.’ The mass campaign urged civilians to create kitchen gardens in whatever spaces available to them or make the playgrounds into vegetable plots.” 

The Bengal famine 

In India the crisis was exacerbated by Japanese occupation of Burma which cut off rice supplies and natural disasters such as the cyclone in 1942 which emerged from the Bay of Bengal and hit the West Bengal-Odisha border causing around 61,000 casualties. The Bengal famine was one of the most devastating with the death toll estimated around 2-3 million casualties.

“Starvation was the main reason for the death. Malaria and lack of health support were identified as other reasons,” Tyagi notes. 

“Development economists like Amartya Sen identified that the British war-related policies, which took food from Bengal and supplied it into the war and used it to mitigate some of the food challenges in Britain, were another major reason for the Bengal famines. After the global embarrassment for the famines, in a jiffy British government launched the ‘Grow more food’ campaign in India in 1943.” 

The relaunch 

In 1947, post-Independence, the Indian government decided to continue the campaign, to extent area under cultivation through land reclamation operations, to supply improvised seeds, to provide manures and fertilizers, and to construct and promote minor works, wells and tanks. The government disbursed small loans and supplied seeds.

However, in the absence of regulatory mechanisms, the efforts to expand cultivable land resulted in massive deforestation.

A 1952 report of the Grow More Food committee also highlighted methodological flaws in the campaign in the assessment of the yield.

“The targets as well as chievements thus indicate what may be called the “production potential” and not the actual increase in production,” reads the report.

Precursor to green revolution

“To rectify these issues, a committee of agricultural statisticians was formed to oversee the survey design, evaluate the findings, and recommend new methodological refinements of assessment of the yield,” says Tyagi.

“They stressed the importance of supervised experiments alongside farmer-reported data to ensure reliability.” 

Under the new paradigm, the field staff started collecting data from farmers who were given the aids and conducting crop cutting experiments to estimate and compare the yield of crops. The findings showed that while seeds gave desirable results, fertilisers did not perform to the expected levels. 

Tyagi notes that this was the first time there was a shift towards field-based and evidence-based evaluation of the agricultural programme in independent India.

“It functioned as a methodological precursor to green revolution methodologies in 1960s. By incorporating modern planning with agricultural statistics, the Grow more food campaign was laying the ground for green revolution statecraft.” 

According to him, it exhibited tendencies of technocratic statecraft which reflected early post-colonial India’s aspiration to govern agriculture through modern science and agricultural statistics. It also limited centralised planning, which was seen previously, he says.

Challenges persist

While modern planning helped improve the governance structure, challenges still persisted in terms of achieving high yield. On of the major reasons was the susceptibility of tradition Indian varieties to bacterial and fungal infection.

Black rust, brown rust and yellow rust was commonly seen in the indigenous varieties. Tyagi highlights how Bihar witnessed famine in 1956-57 caused by yellow rust epidemic.

Yet another issue was the physiological problems of the indigenous varieties.

“Indigenous varieties are tall and top heavy especially when grain heads become large due to fertilization. They can take the heights up to 1.2 meter to 1.4 meter. During high input scenarios, the crops become top heavy and in windy conditions are susceptible to mechanical collapse,” Tyagi explains.

International collaborations

Without a breakthrough in this direction, India sought international collaborations for crop breeding programs. For the U.S., in the context of Cold War geopolitics, this was an opportunity. 

In 1957, Dr. Ralph W. Cummings, then field director of the Rockefeller Foundation, set up the All India Coordinated Maize Improvement Scheme (AICMIS) in India and suggested that agriculture should see a multidisciplinary approach.

“In this manner, the Rockefeller Foundation became a site for policy recommendation, knowledge transfer and cold war geopolitics. They recommended that there should be a restructuring of ICAR, and started supplying textbooks, disbursing fellowships, farm material, laboratory equipment,” says Tyagi. 

The breakthrough

The breakthrough came in 1962. 

That year, M.S. Swaminathan wrote to the Indian Agricultural Research Institute director B. Pal pointing out Norman Borlaug’s success with semi-dwarf wheat in Mexico. Rockefeller foundation had funded the programme. The Indian government made a request to the foundation for the supply of the dwarf variety and Boralug’s expertise. Following Borlaug’s visit to India in 1963, 100kgs of semi-dwarf and dwarf seeds landed in India.

“In 1964, at 55 locations all over India, Lerma Rojo and Sonora 64, supplied by CIMMYT Mexico were tested. Around 4 tons of yield per day was recorded. These dwarf varieties were further subjected for methodological, physiological, agronomic and quality assessments,” says Tyagi, noting that Lerma Rojo was used extensively in the early years of the green revolution till 1969.

“Sharbati sonora was the first commercially successful hybrid wheat variety in India used in the later part of the green revolution.” 

Citing an unpublished article written by M.S. Swaminathan and titled ‘Punjab Miracle’, Tyagi points to the excitement the exceptionally high yield created among agricultural scientists and researchers then.

Demonstrating success

One of the key components of the Green Revolution movement was the National Demonstration Programme (NDP) conceived to showcase the potential of the new agricultural technologies to farmers.

One such demonstratuon was held in Delhi in 1967, where, Tyagi says, almost 2000 acres of land was brought under the high yielding methods. 

“Five high yielding varieties were tested for fertilizer response and other improved management processes. By adopting chemical fertilizer, there was a departure from the traditional low input farming to more agrochemical ways of green revolution. They demonstrated to farmers ways to use fertilizers and crop protection techniques, This became a major site to persuade farmers to partake in the green revolution.” 

Symbol of modernity 

During the process, high yield seeds essentially became symbols of modernity and modern farming. 

According to Tyagi, the Indian State, in the process of domesticating the high yield variety of seeds, decided to adopt agriculture modernisation and seeds, irrigation and fertilisers became co-tools developmental governance.

“The State positioned itself as custodian and distributor of scientific progress. Seeds became material extensions giving state developmental legitimacy. In the process of successful adaptation of dwarf varieties, the State made massive investment in developing infrastructure for seed multiplication stations, new irrigation facilities, creation of subsidies for seeds and fertilisers and extending these services across country for demonstration.” 

Tyagi also notes how policies around MSP and input subsidies shaped farmer behaviour to align with state objectives. 

“The State brought regulation for certification and distribution of the seeds, which created a formal structure for seed distribution and further marginalized the informal indigenous seed distribution practices. The policy of input subsidies and subsidies on the seeds and fertilizer coerced the farmers to take part in the green revolution. Through price control, the State also controlled the output,” he says.

“In that sense the state created a controlled economy where the state is both a planner as well as the marketer. Through green revolution, it averted major famines that bolstered state’s legitimacy. Seeds thus became political instruments. Once linked with cold war geopolitics, they were now linked to national pride, food security and sovereignty.”